Xiaoyun Wang, one of the team of Chinese cryptographers that successfully broke SHA-0 and SHA-1, along with Andrew Yao and Frances Yao, announced new results against SHA-1 yesterday at Crypto's rump session. (Actually, Adi Shamir announced the results in their name, since she and her student did not receive U.S. visas in time to attend the conference.)

Shamir presented few details -- and there's no paper -- but the time complexity of the new attack is 2^63. (Their previous result was 2^69; brute force is 2^80.) He did say that he expected Wang and her students to improve this result over the next few months.

Schneier on Security: New Cryptanalytic Results Against SHA-1

My name is Dan Kaminsky, and I am a security researcher focusing on applied mechanisms for analyzing and understanding very large scale networks.

Interview with Dan Kaminsky on Microsoft 's security

The random chatter of several hundred Microsoft engineers filled the cavernous executive briefing center recently at the company's sprawling campus outside Seattle.

Within minutes after their meeting was convened, however, the hall became hushed. Hackers had successfully lured a Windows laptop onto a malicious wireless network.

"It was just silent," said Stephen Toulouse, a program manager in Microsoft's security unit. "You couldn't hear anybody breathe."

Matt Thomlinson, whose job it is to help make Microsoft engineers create more secure code, noticed that some of the engineers were turning red, becoming obviously angry at the demo hacking incident. Yet as painful as the lesson was, he was glad to see the crowd of engineers taking things personally.

Lots of links to interesting stories here...

Microsoft meets the hackers | CNET News.com

Security experts familiar with the cards' radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, described by Chase as "contactless functionality," expressed some concern over the devices' security strength. Some have suggested that they may make it easy for perpetrators to commit fraud or identity theft.

Saw an add for ChaseBlink tonight. This ought to be interesting... Contactless credit card purchases. No signature. No pin. Just waive it over the reader. I can tell you how I'd have designed it, but I would be suprised if there were no vulnerabilities here.

While this is rather elaborate, a computer controlled rfid device connected to increasingly common cellular wireless internet systems relays the transaction to another reader, maybe taped to a chair in a shopping mall foodcourt.

CRM News: RFID : Chase Bank Rolls Out Contactless Credit Cards

] Bank of America (Research) will require Internet clients
] to register their computers and assign a digital image,
] such as a photo of a pet, to their accounts in an effort
] to cut down on fraud, the bank announced.
]
] The image will appear on the site every time a customer
] has to enter a password.

I think this is a pretty good idea, and quite simple.

An interesting approach to phishing scams

] A ransom note left behind included an e-mail address, and
] the attacker using the address later demanded $200 for
] the digital keys to unlock the files.

It was inevitable that someone would finally actually try cryptovirology. It doesn't work too well when you don't have a way of picking up the money...

CryptoVirus

] One widget, he says, will automatically install itself on
] users' desktops when his "Zaptastic" Web site is visited
] using Apple's Safari browser.

Why would I want Safari to allow web pages to do stuff without asking me?

Link: (This will install a widget if you open it in Safari)
http://stephan.com/widgets/zaptastic/

Mac malware door creaks open | CNET News.com

] Police in Malaysia are hunting for members of a violent
] gang who chopped off a car owner's finger to get round
] the vehicle's hi-tech security system.

Biometrics are dumb.

BBC NEWS - Malaysia car thieves steal finger

] "Let's make all end user devices nonprogrammable," he
] says. "No one can connect to the Internet on a machine
] that creates code. If you want a computer to do
] programming, you would have to be licensed. We could
] license software companies to purchase programmable
] machines, which would be completely traceable along with
] the code created on them."
]
] That would blunt the information security
] problems - suddenly all that intelligence at the edge
] of the network that Amoroso wants to pull back in isn't
] just gone; it's physically stripped. On the other side,
] new levels of accountability and liability are created
] through licensing developers and eliminating anonymity
] from coding.

A collection of ideas for working on the computer security problem. Some are good, some are naive, some are absolutely orwellian, none of them are new. The fact that they are being considered at this level is worth noting. Its all about power. The way the Internet works today, with the end user controllable devices, and the security problems, is the result of a power stuggle with the phone company about who gets to control innovation. Most of the solutions proposed here involve changing that balance of power. In favor of whom, is the question.

All of these things will involve a fight. Some you'll want to fight for, others you'll need to fight against.

The reason DHS can't keep anyone in the computer security czar job for very long is that the people who want that job beleive it should be a peer of the surgeon general and the administration doesn't feel that its THAT important.

Its all about power.

There are a lot of people in this industry who see so red over a few spams that they are ready to lock everyone in a cell. These people need to be checked. My fear is that this list is like Patriot Act ][. A collection of poorly considered authoritarian ideas that is kept close by. Break glass in event of major catastrophy. Then let them all spill out with little or no critical consideration and never get rid of them later.

How To Save The Internet - SECURITY - CIO Magazine Mar 15, 2005

] Two-factor authentication isn't our savior. It won't
] defend against phishing. It's not going to prevent
] identity theft. It's not going to secure online accounts
] from fraudulent transactions. It solves the security
] problems we had ten years ago, not the security problems
] we have today.

Schneier has been getting a lot of attention out of this short essay. I don't agree with him. While I seriously doubt Microsoft is really "dropping passwords" from Longhorn, you are going to see two factor authentication systems, likely involving cellphones, get deployed for certain kinds of internet based financial transactions. Its being playtested in Europe instead of here, because they have better cellphone penetration, but its coming.

Schneier is right when he points out that two-factor auth doesn't solve the problem with MiTM. I'd also point out that pencils do not enable space travel. That doesn't make them useless. Two factor auth solves the problem of offline credential stealing (in theory). Offline credential stealing is a real problem, and the only way to solve it is with two factor auth. Even if you solve the MiTM problem, you still need to solve the offline credential stealing problem, and you are going to solve that problem with two factor auth. You'll eventually need to get two factor auth, one way or the other. I hope its not a biometric, because biometrics are crap for totally unrelated reasons.

The way you address the MiTM problem is with better UI design. The banks and other groups who have an interest in computer security need to pay to get people on the Firefox team to really explore stronger methods of indicating certificate status to end users. The way we do this is really bad. Hell, Safari doesn't even let you pull up certificate details!!! Developers seem to make these security messages either annoying or invisible. It is possible to make them attention grabbing and informative while also not requiring user interaction. Its just a matter of getting it done.

As for Schneier's trojan idea, it sounds neat in theory but in practice I don't think its ever been done. There are lots of ways to make it hard. A way to tell browsers never to write a particular cookie to disk is a good start. Another is to log the user out upon cookie replay.

Another thing I'd like to see is a standard for HTTP transactions that supports authentication but not encryption. The reason is that encryption is too expensive for many websites to scale. Auth only could happen more cheaply, and that might spur more people to use it and become familiar with it. Authentication is more important then encryption for most threat models in modern networks. We're not worried about the FBI stealing your credit card number.

Schneier on Security: The Failure of Two-Factor Authentication