Prizing "stability" over democracy: That doesn't sound like a rhetorical trope of President Bush, does it? Certainly not when he's waxing apologetic about the Arab and Muslim worlds.

"For 60 years," Condoleezza Rice said at the American University in Cairo last June, "my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East--and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."

What about Pakistan?

Pakistani Exceptionalism

This proposal is drawing national attention as visionary, though it is more remarkable for the manner in which it neatly illustrates the problems with how we think about technology and schooling.

Absent in Michigan, and often elsewhere, is serious thought about how technology might help cut costs or modernize educational delivery.

There is no reputable analysis suggesting that the billions invested in technology have enhanced the productivity or performance of America's schools.

Technically Foolish

"People think I'm crazy when they hear I'm getting my second master's degree at 27," says Krumm. "But I felt the degree was necessary to switch the direction of my life."

The Night Shift

"New" is always overrated in politics.

I was thinking of blogging a series on the theme of "overrated".

On Wednesday, Democratic leaders unveiled their new security strategy at an event in Union Station, surrounded by American flags, "REAL SECURITY" banners and other campaign-style props. The Republican National Committee quickly dismissed the new platform as "No New Ideas." The New York Times agreed: "Most of the proposals are not new."

Indeed, the Democrats rehashed their usual litany of security cliches, declaring their opposition to terrorism, proclaiming their support for the troops. And instead of offering voters a positive new agenda, they mostly complained about the Bush administration -- its approach to Iraq, its response to Hurricane Katrina, its "rank incompetence." It could be argued they offered little but obstructionist boilerplate and tired old ideas.

But is that really such an awful strategy?

Who Needs New Ideas, Anyway

This paper has been getting a lot of buzz in the press. Camera says it has errors, and Harvard has removed its logo from the paper.

For the past several decades, and especially since the Six-Day War in 1967, the centrepiece of US Middle Eastern policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering support for Israel and the related effort to spread ‘democracy’ throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardised not only US security but that of much of the rest of the world. This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the US been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries was based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives, but neither explanation can account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the US provides.

Instead, the thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’. Other special-interest groups have managed to skew foreign policy, but no lobby has managed to divert it as far from what the national interest would suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that US interests and those of the other country – in this case, Israel – are essentially identical.

An earlier version is available as a KSG working paper. Also, check out "The Paranoid Style in American Politics", a classic Harper's essay cited in Max Boot's latest column.

LRB | John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt : The Israel Lobby

What makes somebody a Loser, a person doomed to unfulfilled dreams and humiliation? Nobody is born to lose, and yet failure embodies our worst fears. The Loser is our national bogeyman, and his history over the past two hundred years reveals the dark side of success, how economic striving reshaped the self and soul of America.

Born Losers

In today's increasingly polarized political landscape it seems that fewer and fewer citizens hold out hope of persuading one another. Even among those who have not given up on persuasion, few will admit to practicing the art of persuasion known as rhetoric. To describe political speech as "rhetoric" today is to accuse it of being superficial or manipulative. In Saving Persuasion, Bryan Garsten uncovers the early modern origins of this suspicious attitude toward rhetoric and seeks to loosen its grip on contemporary political theory. Revealing how deeply concerns about rhetorical speech shaped both ancient and modern political thought, he argues that the artful practice of persuasion ought to be viewed as a crucial part of democratic politics. He provocatively suggests that the aspects of rhetoric that seem most dangerous--the appeals to emotion, religious values, and the concrete commitments and identities of particular communities--are also those which can draw out citizens' capacity for good judgment. Against theorists who advocate a rationalized ideal of deliberation aimed at consensus, Garsten argues that a controversial politics of partiality and passion can produce a more engaged and more deliberative kind of democratic discourse.

Saving Persuasion

Academic research and policy discussions of credit markets usually focus on borrowing by firms and producers rather than households, which are typically analyzed in terms of their savings and portfolio choices. The Economics of Consumer Credit brings together leading international researchers to focus specifically on consumer debt, presenting current empirical and theoretical research crucial to ongoing policy debates on such topics as privacy rules, the regulation of contractual responsibilities, financial stability, and overindebtedness.

The rapidly developing consumer credit industry in the United States is mirrored by that in Europe, and this volume is noteworthy for its cross-national perspective. Several chapters compare the use of credit markets by households in different countries, while others focus on single country case studies--including consumer credit dynamics in Italy, the role of housing expenditure in the cyclical pattern of borrowing in the United Kingdom, and the use of credit cards by U.S. consumers--to illustrate general insights. Other chapters draw policy lessons from the U.S. experience with bankruptcy regulation and the development of the credit counseling industry. Finally, the book reviews historical, theoretical, and empirical aspects of information sharing, of particular interest in light of the integration of European Union credit markets.

The Economics of Consumer Credit

Does the information on the Web offer many alternative accounts of reality, or does it subtly align with an official version? In Information Politics on the Web, Richard Rogers identifies the cultures, techniques, and devices that rank and recommend information on the Web, analyzing not only the political content of Web sites but the politics built into the Web's infrastructure. Addressing the larger question of what the Web is for, Rogers argues that the Web is still the best arena for unsettling the official and challenging the familiar.

Winner of the 2005 Best Information Science Book of the Year Award presented by the American society for Information Science and Technology (ASIST).

Information Politics on the Web

For decades, a new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. America's ability to remain oblivious to these new movements ended on September 11, 2001. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate.

Based on intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad, Understanding Terror Networks gives us the first social explanation of the global wave of activity. Sageman traces its roots in Egypt, gestation in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, exile in the Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including detailed accounts of life within the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned attacks on the United States.

U.S. government strategies to combat the jihad are based on the traditional reasons an individual was thought to turn to terrorism: poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance. Sageman refutes all these notions, showing that, for the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own.

Understanding Terror Networks combines Sageman's scrutiny of sources, personal acquaintance with Islamic fundamentalists, deep appreciation of history, and effective application of network theory, modeling, and forensic psychology. Sageman's unique research allows him to go beyond available academic studies, which are light on facts, and journalistic narratives, which are devoid of theory. The result is a profound contribution to our understanding of the perpetrators of 9/11 that has practical implications for the war on terror.

Understanding Terror Networks