What's more intriguing is why the surplus countries bought into this -- well, let's call it what it was -- global Ponzi scheme. It wasn't because the financial experts in these countries were stupid. Many of them clearly saw the scam for what it was. Gao Xiqing, an adviser to then-Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, said in 2000 "that if you look at every one of these (derivative) products, they make sense. But in aggregate, they are bull----. They are crap. They serve to cheat people."

But the surplus countries had as much incentive to believe in the short-term solution as the deficit countries did. Once you hold $500 billion in Treasurys, you aren't inclined to say, "Hey, these are not as safe as I thought." When you need higher yields to feed an underfunded state pension plan, you're not inclined to say, "You know these aren't really suitable for a pension fund."

And so, as the risks grew, more-extravagant instruments were needed to keep the money circulating around the globe. And then, one day, the bust in the U.S. housing market, what could have been a relatively small event in a universe with less leverage and less riding on unsustainable guarantees, showed that the system was built on smoke and mirrors.

And the money stopped circulating. And the global economy ground slower and slower in a devastating credit crunch.

How to fix the global economy