This entry is posted in response to k's comment on this quote:
Alarmed by his company's escalating health insurance costs and a frightening scarcity of remedies, Ford Motor Co. Chief Executive William C. Ford Jr. declared in December that the nation needs an entirely new health care system.
Then he tapped Ford's vice chairman to craft a proposal to develop one.
k's comment on this was:
The excerpt above truly struck me. This is Ford motor company devoting resources to crafting a new health care system for the country.
I would point out that this is certainly not the first time this has occurred. There is a fine line between government and industry, and Ford has a history ...
Defense issues, including the missile gap, played a prominent role in the campaign of 1960. President-elect Kennedy, very much concerned with defense matters although lacking Eisenhower's mastery of the issues, first offered the post of secretary of defense to former secretary Robert A. Lovett. When Lovett declined, Kennedy chose Robert S. McNamara on Lovett's recommendation.
In 1946 McNamara joined Ford Motor Company as manager of planning and financial analysis. He advanced rapidly through a series of top-level management positions to the presidency of Ford on 9 November 1960, one day after Kennedy's election. The first company head selected outside the Ford family, McNamara received substantial credit for Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period. Less than five weeks after becoming president at Ford, he accepted Kennedy's invitation to join his cabinet.
Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy, in his own words "providing aggressive leadership questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress."
Initially the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on 28 March 1961 guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program.
McNamara played a much larger role in the formulation of nuclear strategy than his predecessors.
As defined by McNamara, assured destruction meant that the United States would be able to destroy in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. To make this strategy credible, McNamara speeded up the modernization and expansion of weapon and delivery systems.