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Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by Decius at 1:57 am EDT, Sep 17, 2004 |
] Of all of the different views that have now come to be
] associated with the neoconservatives, the strangest one
] to me was the confidence that the United States could
] transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go
] on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It
] struck me as strange precisely because these same
] neoconservatives had spent much of the past generation
] warning about the dangers of ambitious social
] engineering, and how social planners could never control
] behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the
] United States cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores
] in Washington, dc, how does it expect to bring democracy
] to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is
] virulently anti-American to boot? This is apparently the key essay in which Fukuyama nailed the
administration to the wall on Iraq. The lay reader is a little out
of context here as its clearly an ongoing argument that he has
been having with them for years, and its steeped in the jargon
of foreign policy analysis, but I caught on quickly enough. His arguments are clear-cut, complete, and free from the
emotional attacks of typical punditry. I also happen to agree
with him, mostly, and I don't usually agree with Fukuyama. His suggestion that we construct a formal federal department
of nation building is both pragmatic and extremely unsettling.
Hammers tend to find nails. Vanity is as much a sin as Avarice. |
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RE: Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by Rattle at 6:52 pm EDT, Sep 18, 2004 |
Decius wrote:
] His suggestion that we construct a formal federal department
] of nation building is both pragmatic and extremely unsettling.
]
] Hammers tend to find nails. I was just skimming over the article again, and I missed the point where he suggested setting up a federal department of nation building.. I only saw the suggested creation of multi-national institutions. I would support the creation of a formal institution to study nation building, while granting that doing it as a federal department is not the greatest of ideas. These topics are already addressed at organizations ranging from academia to RAND and Heritage Institute like think tanks. I can't think of any reason why such important and relevant studies should continue to take place only under these circumstances, and not as the primary research mission of a more focused (and ideally open) multi-national institution. We have many hammers, ranging from our military complex to our government backed r & d. These were created because of the nails.. Taking our hammers and clearly labeling them, the creation of infrastructure (or bureaucracy?), is not vanity or avarice. |
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RE: Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by noteworthy at 6:10 pm EDT, Oct 9, 2004 |
Decius wrote:
] His arguments are clear-cut, complete, and free from the
] emotional attacks of typical punditry. I also happen to agree
] with him, mostly, and I don't usually agree with Fukuyama.
]
] His suggestion that we construct a formal federal department
] of nation building is both pragmatic and extremely unsettling. What is it about this suggestion that you find so unsettling? When Nick refers to "think tanks" as an alternative to a federal department, I think this misses the suggestion. What we need is a "do tank", not a "think tank". |
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RE: Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by Decius at 12:56 am EDT, Oct 10, 2004 |
noteworthy wrote:
] What is it about this suggestion that you find so unsettling? Its like building an offensive nuclear weapons arsenal. Hammers tend to find nails. |
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RE: Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by Vile at 2:40 am EDT, Oct 10, 2004 |
noteworthy wrote:
] Decius wrote:
] ] His arguments are clear-cut, complete, and free from the
] ] emotional attacks of typical punditry. I also happen to
] agree
] ] with him, mostly, and I don't usually agree with Fukuyama.
] ]
] ] His suggestion that we construct a formal federal department
]
] ] of nation building is both pragmatic and extremely
] unsettling.
]
] What is it about this suggestion that you find so unsettling?
]
] When Nick refers to "think tanks" as an alternative to a
] federal department, I think this misses the suggestion. What
] we need is a "do tank", not a "think tank". Yes, I believe Hitler and Stalin had these "do tanks" you speak of. I will stick with a think tank, representative politicians and the ability to vote on what direction the "Do tank" should drive. |
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Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by Rattle at 6:32 pm EDT, Sep 18, 2004 |
In this article for The National Interest, Francis Fukuyama rips into the viewpoints of Charles Krauthammer, which have acquired strong influence inside the Bush Administration foreign policy team and beyond. The primary subject is nation building in Iraq, the larger context is America's relations with our allies and the Middle East, our position as the only superpower, and the war on terror. Suggested reading. Fukuyama is a very clear thinker. All his points here are valid, relevant, and well supported. |
Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment
by noteworthy at 5:59 pm EDT, Oct 9, 2004 |
Americans have no particular taste or facility for nation-building: we want exit strategies rather than empires. Lurking like an unbidden guest at a dinner party is the reality of what has happened in Iraq since the US invasion: We have been our usual inept and disorganized selves in planning for and carrying out the reconstruction, something that was predictible in advance and should not have surprised anyone familiar with American history. The point here is not who is right, but rather that the prudential case was not nearly as open-and-shut as neoconservatives believe. Krauthammer talks as if the Bush Administration's judgment had been vindicated at every turn, and that any questioning of it can only be the result of base or dishonest motives. Would that this were so. The fact that our judgment was flawed has created an enormous legitimacy problem for us, one that will hurt our interests for a long time to come. The hope that we would be awarded ex post legitimacy was not an unreasonable calculation. It might indeed have materialized had the United States found a large and active WMD program in Iraq after the invasion. BINGO! This is why Bush was unhappy about not finding WMDs. His comment in the debate makes more sense now. The world is different now than it was during the Cold War in ways that will affect our future ability to exert leadership and claim to speak on behalf of the world as a whole. In al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups, we do in fact confront an enemy that hates us for what we are rather than for what we do. Actually, experts would disagree with that characterization of al-Qaeda. Read Imperial Hubris, for example. And now, for the best part: It is inevitable that we will get sucked into large social-engineering projects in the future, and we need to be much better prepared. This means establishing a permanent office with authority and resources appropriate for the job next time around as part of a broader restructuring of the US government's soft-power agencies. |
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