Stratfor: Geopolitical Intelligence Report - August 8, 2006

Break Point: What Went Wrong

By George Friedman

On May 23, we published a Geopolitical Intelligence Report titled "
Break Point ." In that article, we wrote: "It is now nearly
Memorial Day. The violence in Iraq will surge, but by July 4 there
either will be clear signs that the Sunnis are controlling the
insurgency -- or there won't. If they are controlling the
insurgency, the United States will begin withdrawing troops in
earnest. If they are not controlling the insurgency, the United
States will begin withdrawing troops in earnest. Regardless of
whether the [political settlement] holds, the U.S. war in Iraq is
going to end: U.S. troops either will not be needed, or will not be
useful. Thus, we are at a break point -- at least for the
Americans."

In our view, the fundamental question was whether the Sunnis would
buy into the political process in Iraq. We expected a sign, and we
got it in June, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed -- in our
view, through intelligence provided by the Sunni leadership. The
same night al-Zarqawi was killed, the Iraqis announced the
completion of the Cabinet: As part of a deal that finalized the
three security positions (defense, interior and national security),
the defense ministry went to a Sunni. The United States followed
that move by announcing a drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq,
starting with two brigades. All that was needed was a similar
signal of buy-in from the Shia -- meaning they would place controls
on the Shiite militias that were attacking Sunnis. The break point
seemed very much to favor a political resolution in Iraq.

It never happened. The Shia, instead of reciprocating the Sunni and
American gestures, went into a deep internal crisis. Shiite groups
in Basra battled over oil fields. They fought in Baghdad. We
expected that the mainstream militias under the Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) would gain control of the
dissidents and then turn to political deal-making. Instead, the
internal Shiite struggle resolved itself in a way we did not
expect: Rather than reciprocating with a meaningful political
gesture, the Shia intensified their attacks on the Sunnis. The
Sunnis, clearly expecting this phase to end, held back -- and then
cut loose with their own retaliations. The result was, rather than
a political settlement, civil war. The break point had broken away
from a resolution.

Part of the explanation is undoubtedly to be found in Iraq itself.
The prospect of a centralized government, even if dominated by the
majority Shia, does not seem to have been as attractive to Iraqi
Shia as absolute regional control, which would guarantee them all
of the revenues from the southern oil fields, rather ... [ Read More (2.1k in body) ]