] This white paper responds point by point to several
] papers and web pages which have criticized the TCPA chip
] based on misunderstandings and incorrect analysis.

This is an interesting paper. I'd like to see a response from Ross Anderson. Essentially, what it argues is that the capabilities that could be imagined for using TCPA chips as Fritz chips do not exist. A strong, but incomplete, argument is also made that DRM is not practical in the TCPA framework as it currently exists. Microsoft's Pallidium effort is claimed to involve a different chip which is similar, but not exactly the same. It is not known if Pallidium will support TCPA.

I think this is enough to say that its worth taking another look at TCPA. This analysis is not clear enough to say that I would recommend buying it. I want to know exactly how impractical DRM is in TCPA, and I want to know exactly what you can and cannot do with the endorsement key.

As my computer is secure to the extent that I control what it does and for whom, DRM and security are mutually exclusive. I will not buy a computer that enables third parties to absolutely subvert my control. If it can be demonstrated that TCPA cannot be used for this purpose, then I'll buy one.