] This white paper responds point by point to several
] papers and web pages which have criticized the TCPA chip
] based on misunderstandings and incorrect analysis.

This is an interesting paper. I'd like to see a response from Ross Anderson. Essentially, what it argues is that the capabilities that could be imagined for using TCPA chips as Fritz chips do not exist. A strong, but incomplete, argument is also made that DRM is not practical in the TCPA framework as it currently exists. Microsoft's Pallidium effort is claimed to involve a different chip which is similar, but not exactly the same. It is not known if Pallidium will support TCPA.

I think this is enough to say that its worth taking another look at TCPA. This analysis is not clear enough to say that I would recommend buying it. I want to know exactly how impractical DRM is in TCPA, and I want to know exactly what you can and cannot do with the endorsement key.

As my computer is secure to the extent that I control what it does and for whom, DRM and security are mutually exclusive. I will not buy a computer that enables third parties to absolutely subvert my control. If it can be demonstrated that TCPA cannot be used for this purpose, then I'll buy one.

IBM claims TCPA is NOT a 'Fritz Chip.'