Steve Bellovin et al:
Architecture matters a lot, and in subtle ways.
Internet protocols are complicated and sometimes they fail in subtle ways that defy naive assumptions.
These are harder problems that require more thought.
Is more what we really need?
We need to balance privacy interests with the state's interest in monitoring suspected criminals.
Will not wearing a life recorder be used as evidence that someone is up to no good?
Noam Cohen's friend:
Privacy is serious. It is serious the moment the data gets collected, not the moment it is released.
And once data has been collected using the lawful intercept, it can be sent to any destination, not merely to an authorized user.
It's not where you take things from -- it's where you take them to.
It's gonna be cool. Give me money. No consequences, no whammies, money.
It's not just the router vendor and the [Internet service provider] who have an interest in how this interface is built.
We all do.
We wanted the best, but it turned out as always.
The situation is fairly bleak.
The ship has already sailed on the question of whether or not it's reasonable for the government to collect evidence about everyone all the time so that it can be used against them in court if someone accuses them of a crime or civil tort. This is just another brick in the wall.
What you tell Google you've told the government.
The exploitation of lawful intercept is more than theoretical.
Several rumors from Google sources [allege] that China accessed Google's US Government [lawful] intercept system, which provides Gmail subjects/dates.
The Chinese government tried to hide the incident. It failed to; think how often it succeeds.