Mr. Patrick visited Iraq as a weapons inspector for the United Nations in 1994 on the Iraqi clandestine biological warfare program. He now acts as a consultant to the F.B.I., the Defense Intelligence Agency and the C.I.A.

The Threat of Biological Warfare

This book will be published in June 2002. No more details as yet available.

Many schools of thought assert that Western culture has never been more politically apathetic. Tim Jordan's Activism! refutes this claim. In his powerful polemic, Jordan shows how acts of civil disobedience have come to dominate the political landscape. Because we inhabit such a quickly changing, high-tech and fragmented culture, the single-issue political movements and stable, conservative authorities of the past are continually being questioned. Traditional political battles have been replaced by the popular, collective practices of a new political activism. From Europe to the USA, from Australia to South America, from the Left to the Right, Jordan introduces us to the citizens who make up d-i-y culture: eco-activists, animal liberators, neo-fascists, ravers, anti-abortionists, squatters, hunt saboteurs and hacktivists. In his view, activism comprises a new ethics of living for the 21st century.

Tim Jordan teaches in the Department of Sociology at the Open University, London.

The author's previous book is _Cyberpower_, for which Amazon has 18 sample pages available at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0415170788

_Activism! Direct Action, Hacktivism and the Future of Society_

In all likelihood, this symposium, held in Arlington, VA on 6-8 Feb 2002, was a primary source of today's contentious NYT article (which is my previous log entry). There was a panel discussion entitled "Strategic Psychological Operations" in which the following topics were presented:

The Role of PSYOP in Combating Terrorism
PSYOP in Urban Opertions
International Public Information
The DOD Role in Strategic Influence Operations
Joint Strategic PSYOP Capabilities and Requirements
Army Strategic PSYOP Initiatives

The link is to a PDF brochure for the symposium. 12 pages, 1 MB.

NDIA Symposium on Low Intensity Conflict [PDF]

"The Pentagon is developing plans to provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly countries, military officials said."

Memetics Goes Global In A Big Way

Published January 17, 2002. 25 pages in Acrobat PDF.

African countries overwhelmingly expressed their support for the US-led efforts on the war against terrorism ... Some ... are reportedly sharing intelligence ... in the next phase of the terror war Africa may prove key ... ... officials note that Africa ... can play a pivotal role [but] believe that Africa is a potential breeding ground for terrorism. ... In June 1995 ... an Egyptian extremist group tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak ... there are over a dozen countries where terrorist groups have established a strong presence in Africa ... including Sudan and Somalia. Sudan has long been considered a rogue state ... Since 1991, Somalia has been without a central government. ... terrorist and extremist groups to flourish in Somalia ... African officials [support] extradit[ion] and apprehen[sion] of terrorist and extremist groups ... They argue that these groups are raising funds and organizing in the west, often unhindered by western governments. ...

Africa and the War on Terrorism | Congressional Research Service [PDF]

* What are the most obviously worrisome policy and and legal questions posed by new information technologies and and achitectures?
* Do new technologies promise to solve any current policy or legal problems?
* Who ought to resolve questions of questions of law and policy posed by new technologies?
* What will change institutionally for our legal and policy making institutions as a result of new technologies?
* Can scientists and engineers invent yet other technologies to solve the problems posed thus far by the telecommunications revolution?
* In the current environment, how should lawyers advise companies trying to develop new technologies or governments seeking to cope with such technologies?

Information Technology and Legal Regulation: Promise and Pitfalls

For some time, military and political leaders in both Saudi Arabia and the United States have been quietly debating the value of a continuing U.S. military presence in the kingdom. Some on the American side argue that restrictions on U.S. activities and frictions with the Saudi government outweigh the advantages of basing planes, command and control systems and some 5,000 troops on Saudi soil; others say it would be far more difficult for the United States to defend the Persian Gulf, or mount a new campaign against Iraq, without the deployments. ...

Published in the Sunday, January 20, 2002 edition of the Washington Post.

Security and Saudi Arabia | editorial in Washington Post

The United States has an opportunity to set new terms for its alliances in the Middle East. The bargain struck with Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War seemed successful for a decade, but now the United States is facing the consequences: Washington backed Cairo's and Riyadh's authoritarian regimes, and they begat al Qaeda. The Bush administration should heed the lesson.

This is one of several good articles in a special section entitled "Long War in the Making" in the Jan/Feb 2002 issue of _Foreign Affairs_ magazine. The author, Martin Indyk, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former Senior Director on the National Security Council.

Back to the Bazaar | Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2002

Continuing the biotech regulation/security theme, here's one from the September 28 issue of _Science_. This was referenced by a letter (and response) in the 4 Jan 2002 issue of _Science_, entitled "A Unified Definition of Biosecurity". (No summary is available; full text at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/295/5552/44a for subscribers only.)

Biological Security in a Changed World
Christopher F. Chyba

The horrifying events of 11 September 2001 serve notice that civilization will confront severe challenges in the 21st century. As national security budgets expand in response, we should recognize that only a broad conception of security will be adequate to meet some of the threats that we may face. Biological security provides a powerful example. It must address both the challenge of biological weapons and that of infectious disease. The right approach should benefit public health even if major acts of biological terrorism never occur. Our thinking about biological security must transcend old misplaced analogies to nuclear and chemical security.

Nuclear security has been based on nonproliferation, deterrence, and defense, with intelligence woven throughout. [...]

Effective biological security requires a different mix. [...]

The transfer of dangerous biological agents should be controlled where possible, and the spread of the technologies and personnel to weaponize them should be impeded. But any biological nonproliferation regime will necessarily be less robust than its nuclear counterpart, [...]

Biological terrorism also challenges requirements for successful deterrence. [...]

In the face of these difficulties, good intelligence is all the more important. [...]

Because of disease incubation times, the first responders to a biological attack may well be health care workers at hospitals and clinics rather than specialized units. The speed and effectiveness of a response will depend on disease surveillance [...]

Disease surveillance and response are not nonproliferation measures, so cannot substitute for an effective verification regime under the Biological Weapons Convention. But biological security requires the developed world, especially the United States, to see that its ongoing self-interest is closely allied with sustainable public health improvements in the developing world. And the explosion of biotechnology, with the weapons implications that follow from it, requires the scientific community to discuss its responsibilities in earnest. [...]

Christopher Chyba is co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, associate professor (Research) in the Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences, and Carl Sagan Chair for the Study of Life in the Universe at the SETI Institute. He served on the staff of the National Security Council under President Clinton.

The article summary is available with free registration; full text available by subscription.

Biological Security in a Changed World

In the ongoing debate that was (re)ignited with Bill Joy's April 2000 article in Wired magazine ("Why the future doesn't need us"), Francis Fukuyama writes about biotech regulation in the Winter 2002 issue of The Public Interest. Abstract/summary/intro included below.

How to Regulate Science
By Francis Fukuyama

Both those who embrace new biotechnologies and those who are wary of them tend to claim that the advance of science is beyond social control. Francis Fukuyama argues that this fatalism is mistaken: Science can be effectively regulated, if we possess the political will to do so. Existing regulatory agencies such as the FDA, however, are not the right organizations for this new and distinctive work.

(Note: this is a temporary URL -- this article will go offline or be moved in Spring 2002.)

How to regulate science | Francis Fukuyama, The Public Interest, Winter 2002