George Friedman analyzes the Uncoupling in his weekly report. Most important, what is the relationship between the war against the Taliban and the war against al Qaeda? Does the United States need to succeed against the Taliban to be successful against transnational Islamist terrorists?
In contrast to Coll, he sees the Taliban as essentially Afghan: It is important to remember that al Qaeda was separate from the Taliban; the former was a multinational force, while the Taliban were an internal Afghan political power.
He writes about the Taliban's hold on the people: The tribes have long memories, and they know that foreigners don’t stay very long. Betting on the United States and Karzai does not strike them as prudent.
To anyone still harboring hopes of Victory, he is conclusive: There is no conceivable force the United States can deploy to pacify Afghanistan. The United States can exhaust itself attacking minor targets based on poor intelligence. It won’t get anywhere.
Needless to say Friedman is skeptical of the emerging Obama/Petraeus Afghan surge. Ultimately the only workable strategy is Uncoupling: We expect that the United States will separate the two conflicts. The cost of failure in Afghanistan is simply too high and the connection to counterterrorist activities too tenuous for the two strategies to be linked.
Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the War Against Al Qaeda | 
