Now, finally, I have an ask: for your indulgence and your understanding on the subject of encryption. Our inability to access encrypted information poses public safety challenges.
Pew, via Elizabeth Dwoskin:
91% of Americans feel they've lost control over their personal data.
Just through a five-minute normal conversation we have gotten every ounce of information possible from them to commit identity theft.
We'll be never lost until we lose our tools, and then we'll be much more lost than ever before.
It is something of the paradox of technological progress that, in our efforts to become invulnerable, we usually gain new, unexpected vulnerabilities, leaving us in vaguely the same condition after all.
It is probably true that entities with useful vulnerability information are not sharing it frequently enough with the government. And when the government asks them why they don't share, they say,"because we'd like liability protection." Because what even slightly regulated corporation doesn't want liability protection?
Over the next decade, advanced weapons platforms ... will flood the arms market ...
As the Middle East descends into proxy wars, sectarian conflicts and battles against terrorist networks, countries in the region that have stockpiled American military hardware are now actually using it and wanting more. The result is a boom for American defense contractors ... but also the prospect of a dangerous new arms race ...
IBM's Open Power program is getting particular attention in China ... because it plays into local demands that foreign tech companies disclose intellectual property, open up encryption standards and submit to invasive security audits of products.
The truth is, law enforcement ... is living in the golden age of surveillance.
The Great Cannon is not simply an extension of the Great Firewall, but a distinct attack tool that hijacks traffic to (or presumably from) individual IP addresses, and can arbitrarily replace unencrypted content as a man-in-the-middle.
The court orders used now ... do not specifically mention cell site simulators, instead favoring this dense language: "Twenty-four hour a day assistance to include switch based solutions including precision location pursuant to probable cause based information queries and all reasonable assistance to permit the aforementioned Agencies to triangulate target location, including but not limited to terminating interfering service on the target telephone."